Sensors - What Good Are They?
We’ve previously noted that the US military has gone all in on sensor networks and unmanned vehicles as the basis for its Third Offset Strategy which is intended to provide the US with a military advantage over its enemies. We’ve also noted the Navy’s commitment to distributed lethality which also depends on regional sensor networks to provide targeting to roving ships with a few anti-ship missiles. Further, the entire basis of the F-35’s hoped for ‘superiority’ is sensor fusion and situational awareness (it’s sure not air combat maneuvering!).
Unfortunately, we’ve also noted that the entire concept of sensor and data networks is inherently flawed. Non-enemy induced network crashes, sensor failures, UAV communications link failures, and GPS failures are commonplace. Add to that wartime cyber attacks, jamming, GPS disruption, electronic countermeasures, electronic spoofing, false signal injection, etc. and the prospects for successful sensor and data networks is dismal – and yet we’re betting everything on exactly this.
Are we being overly pessimistic? Well, consider,
• The Russians have been giving an object lesson in electronic warfare in the Ukraine and Syria. US commanders have acknowledged that the Russians have disrupted and ‘disabled’ our dedicated electronic warfare EC-130 aircraft over Syria.
• Iran is believed to have disabled and captured US UAVs.
• US Navy unmanned underwater vehicles routinely wander off due to communication’s loss, never to be seen again.
• Despite having inertial navigation systems and GPS, the Aegis cruiser Port Royal managed to run aground in well known, well charted, home waters.
• Despite GPS and extensive regional sensors, two US Navy riverine boats became lost and wandered into Iranian waters and were captured.
• The Vincennes shot down an airliner despite having continuous, unhindered radar contact.
• Despite the most advanced naval sensors in the world, the Navy has been unable to determine whether any of three separate attacks on a Burke class destroyer off Yemen actually occurred.
• Despite the world’s most advanced radar, sonar, and electro-optical sensors two Burke class destroyers managed to collide with large, slow, non-stealthy commercial ships.
The examples are nearly endless.
Now, as has been recently and widely reported, the Norwegian Nansen class frigate Helge Ingstad (F313) has collided with an oil tanker and been beached to avoid sinking. The ship has essentially capsized and is laying on its side on the beach.
The Nansen class frigate possesses a multitude of advanced sensors of various types including,
• SPY-1F 3D multi-mode radar
• Reutech RSR 210N air/sea surveillance radar
• Sagem Vigy 20 Electro-optical
• MRS 2000 hull mounted sonar
• Condor CS-3701 ESM/ECM
Despite this impressive array of sensors which should have provided unparalleled situational awareness, the ship managed to collide with a tanker.
On a related note, yet another modern ‘warship’ has been nearly sunk by a single ‘hit’ – not exactly a tribute to modern warship design, is it? But, I digress …
The empirical evidence is overwhelming. Our vaunted sensors and networks do not work at anywhere near the claimed levels.
Our sensor and network systems are simply not reliable.
They don’t work.
And yet, we’re betting our military future on them working flawlessly and doing so in the face of a vast array of countermeasures.
The reasons for failure are many and varied and not all of the failures are due purely to the sensors and networks.
• Comm. links fail (UAVs being lost)
• Networks spontaneously fail (we’ve all experienced this at work or in the military)
• Maintenance shortages cause degraded sensors (the Aegis system being a prime example)
• Human action based on sensor data is inherently flawed (Vincennes)
The overall conclusion is that we can’t count on sensor and data networks and we can’t count on having situation awareness – and yet that’s exactly what we’re betting our military future on. It’s also worth noting that all of the examples of sensor and data network failings are peacetime examples when everything should work perfectly. How much worse will our situational awareness be during war?
Now, having said all that, I’m certainly not suggesting that we should abandon sensors and networks. What I’m saying is that we should acknowledge the inherent limitations and tendencies to fail and not bet our military future on them. Instead, we should use them as adjuncts to basic technologies (binoculars or sextant, for example) and common sense (post lookouts!). We should train to function without sensors, to any great extent, and then we’ll be pleasantly surprised when they do, occasionally, work. We have to break our mindset of dependence on sensors and networks and learn to stick out heads out the porthole and look and reason for ourselves.
We also need to recognize that data, alone, is useless in war. We need firepower to destroy whatever we see. Failing that, we’ll have the most perfect awareness in history of the enemy that kills us using low tech, indiscriminate, area bombardments. For all its impressive development of electronic warfare capabilities, the Russians have not neglected to also develop impressive families of armored vehicles, advanced cluster munitions, treaty busting cruise missiles, very long range air-to-air missiles, advanced torpedoes, etc. They understand that, ultimately, firepower wins wars.
Unfortunately, we’ve also noted that the entire concept of sensor and data networks is inherently flawed. Non-enemy induced network crashes, sensor failures, UAV communications link failures, and GPS failures are commonplace. Add to that wartime cyber attacks, jamming, GPS disruption, electronic countermeasures, electronic spoofing, false signal injection, etc. and the prospects for successful sensor and data networks is dismal – and yet we’re betting everything on exactly this.
Are we being overly pessimistic? Well, consider,
• The Russians have been giving an object lesson in electronic warfare in the Ukraine and Syria. US commanders have acknowledged that the Russians have disrupted and ‘disabled’ our dedicated electronic warfare EC-130 aircraft over Syria.
• Iran is believed to have disabled and captured US UAVs.
• US Navy unmanned underwater vehicles routinely wander off due to communication’s loss, never to be seen again.
• Despite having inertial navigation systems and GPS, the Aegis cruiser Port Royal managed to run aground in well known, well charted, home waters.
• Despite GPS and extensive regional sensors, two US Navy riverine boats became lost and wandered into Iranian waters and were captured.
• The Vincennes shot down an airliner despite having continuous, unhindered radar contact.
• Despite the most advanced naval sensors in the world, the Navy has been unable to determine whether any of three separate attacks on a Burke class destroyer off Yemen actually occurred.
• Despite the world’s most advanced radar, sonar, and electro-optical sensors two Burke class destroyers managed to collide with large, slow, non-stealthy commercial ships.
The examples are nearly endless.
Now, as has been recently and widely reported, the Norwegian Nansen class frigate Helge Ingstad (F313) has collided with an oil tanker and been beached to avoid sinking. The ship has essentially capsized and is laying on its side on the beach.
The Nansen class frigate possesses a multitude of advanced sensors of various types including,
• SPY-1F 3D multi-mode radar
• Reutech RSR 210N air/sea surveillance radar
• Sagem Vigy 20 Electro-optical
• MRS 2000 hull mounted sonar
• Condor CS-3701 ESM/ECM
Despite this impressive array of sensors which should have provided unparalleled situational awareness, the ship managed to collide with a tanker.
On a related note, yet another modern ‘warship’ has been nearly sunk by a single ‘hit’ – not exactly a tribute to modern warship design, is it? But, I digress …
The empirical evidence is overwhelming. Our vaunted sensors and networks do not work at anywhere near the claimed levels.
Our sensor and network systems are simply not reliable.
They don’t work.
And yet, we’re betting our military future on them working flawlessly and doing so in the face of a vast array of countermeasures.
The reasons for failure are many and varied and not all of the failures are due purely to the sensors and networks.
• Comm. links fail (UAVs being lost)
• Networks spontaneously fail (we’ve all experienced this at work or in the military)
• Maintenance shortages cause degraded sensors (the Aegis system being a prime example)
• Human action based on sensor data is inherently flawed (Vincennes)
The overall conclusion is that we can’t count on sensor and data networks and we can’t count on having situation awareness – and yet that’s exactly what we’re betting our military future on. It’s also worth noting that all of the examples of sensor and data network failings are peacetime examples when everything should work perfectly. How much worse will our situational awareness be during war?
Now, having said all that, I’m certainly not suggesting that we should abandon sensors and networks. What I’m saying is that we should acknowledge the inherent limitations and tendencies to fail and not bet our military future on them. Instead, we should use them as adjuncts to basic technologies (binoculars or sextant, for example) and common sense (post lookouts!). We should train to function without sensors, to any great extent, and then we’ll be pleasantly surprised when they do, occasionally, work. We have to break our mindset of dependence on sensors and networks and learn to stick out heads out the porthole and look and reason for ourselves.
We also need to recognize that data, alone, is useless in war. We need firepower to destroy whatever we see. Failing that, we’ll have the most perfect awareness in history of the enemy that kills us using low tech, indiscriminate, area bombardments. For all its impressive development of electronic warfare capabilities, the Russians have not neglected to also develop impressive families of armored vehicles, advanced cluster munitions, treaty busting cruise missiles, very long range air-to-air missiles, advanced torpedoes, etc. They understand that, ultimately, firepower wins wars.
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